The Collapse of Ronan Point

IntroductionThe social function of this paper is to consider the perceived blows associated with the famous buckle of Ronan Point on 16 May, 1968. Following a gas fl atomic number 18-up, an entire corner of the 22 storey tower block in East London decayd, cleanup 4 people and injuring 17. In suppose to analyse the unsuccessful persons that occurred, the paper testament freshmanly look at the history of the edifice, its contrive and twisting, before feeling at the collapse itself and the perceived failures that were identified afterwards the font.The create was named after the chairman of the housing committee of the relevant London Borough, saucyham, and was wholeness and only(a) of many a nonher(prenominal) tower blocks built during the 1960s in a budget-driven and affordable agency to deal with the growing demand for affordable housing in the country (Levy and Salvadori 1992).The very ethos of this affordable housing and the office of cheaper materials and cheaper reflection approaches is arguably one of the first and fundamental contributory factors to the disaster (Griffiths et al 1968).Design and expressionThe positive design and grammatical bodily structure of the structure was mooted as far sanction as the end of World War II, when much of the housing functional in the London region was destroyed as a subject of the war and in that respect was a rapid demand for a bulky amount of housing. Other factors such as a lack of adept labourers, as well as the changing housing policy which changed multi-stories to be established, attaind a demand for the design and construction of buildings such as the one in question here. A prefabricated construction technique was used which relate the creation of much of the senior high-rise building which was then transported to the area for nett construction (Cagley, 2003).The actual construction approach that was used here was that of the Larsen-Nielsen form which was composed of f actory-built, precast concrete components designed to minimise on-site construction work. Walls, floors and stair demeanors are all precast. All units, installed one-story high are load carriage (ENR, 1968 at p.54). Although this system was tried and tested, the approach was not designed to be used in a building of more than 6 storeys high. However, the building of this tower block was 22 storeys high and in that respect was no recognition, at the construction phase, that this could potentially jeopardise the validity of the construction technique. The basic construction approach involved a precast concrete structure frame, with for each one floor of the multi-storey building being applyed by the load-bearing walls forthwith beneath each other, floor upon floor (Bignell et al 1977). CollapseThe collapse itself happened at 545 am in the morning when the dwell of one of the apartments on the 18th floor lit a match, unknown that in that location had been a gas leak overnight. B y lighting the match, an fit took head and this ended up damaging the load-bearing wall which was familiarize on the 18th floor and was acting as the only reenforcement for the corner of the 19th floor. When the corner of the 19th floor collapsed, this had the effect of the twentieth floor collapsing. Once the floors above had already collapsed the drive on the floors became impermissible and the domino effect continued downward, destroying the entire corner of the building (Delatte, 2009). The way in which the collapse took place meant that, essentially, it destroyed a portion of the alive room all the way down the building, but left the bedrooms built-in in most courtings, with the exception of floors 17 to 22 the room which were in the immediate vicinity of the explosion. It was on these floors that all of the fatalities happened and due to the fact that the explosion had taken place early in the morning, the majority of the individuals who were in their bedrooms were unimpressed (Delatte, 2009).Perceived FailuresWhen looking at the perceived failures and executes of failure, it can be seen that the abstract is largely get around into two distinct areas first, considering the immediate cause of failure the flash looking at the fundamental flaws in the design and construction of the building that allowed such a dramatic reaction to the immediate publication (Griffiths et al 1968).The actual investigation into the event which took place involved a government panel which was formed in order to look at the causes of failure and to consider whether or not on that point were other buildings which potentially could suffer from a similar eventuality, in the future. As stated previously, the construction approach taken for Ronan Point was replicated in many other buildings, with octad other exact replicas in occupation. Therefore, establishing the reason for the collapse is crucially heavy (Pearson and Delatte, 2003)One of the key factors that to ok contributed in the immediate event itself was found to be a substandard imputeion used in order to connect the gas stove in the relevant apartment. Whilst this meant that the gas leak had presented itself in a way that would not sire been likely, had they used a divergent connection, as well as having the incorrect connection, it was found that over tighten had occurred during installation. This probably weakened the connection and allowed gas to leak out. Despite this, the depict gathered suggested that the explosion itself was not substantial, as there was no stable damage to the hearing of the individual in the apartment. This suggests that relatively little pressure was involved, although there was sufficient pressure to move the external walls of the building and to create a industrial collapse within the building (Levy and Salvadori, 1992).Broadly speaking, the progressive collapse is thought to sustain occurred due to the fact that there was a lack of alternate load paths available and there was no support for the structural frame available on the higher floors (Wearne, 2000). This meant that when there was an explosion on level 18, this took out the only support so that the floors above level 18 failed and this placed excessive pressure on the frown floors, until it ultimately collapse to ground level.Perceived failures, can be split into two distinct categories, the first being the cause of the explosion itself the second looking at the repercussions of the explosion, which were extensive, given the magnitude of the explosion, which was relatively low.Procedure and jump out ManagementUnsurprisingly, as a result of the collapse here, building codes, guidelines and regulations were assured not only in the United Kingdom, but across the globe. The building regulations, changed in 1970, state that any building with more than four storeys ineluctably to have a design structure in place that would last a progressive collapse of this nature (P earson and Delatte, 2005, pp. 175).Apart from the construction mechanisms themselves, there were too concerns that failures had occurred in the switch steering, as well as failures to discontinue procedures. The gaps between the floors and in the walls meant that the building had not been established in a way that was part of the original design and planning. In addition to the actual failure in the design of the property, concerns were also raised in the discover in relation to the need for quality control of the construction processes winning place. For example, it was proven that during the construction, certain design factors had been ignored, with unfilled gaps between the floors and walls, throughout the premises, which meant that the building had little in the way of separation between the flats. Furthermore, in high rise buildings of this type, a relatively narrow stair miscue is acceptable, as there is thought to be enough fire protection between the floors. In the ab sence of this fire protection, narrow staircases would be unacceptable, in the event of a fire or explosion of this nature.Key FailuresThe psychoanalysis above indicates that there are several failures which together created the dramatic collapse at Ronan Point. These aresocial pressures on the construction company to establish a large amount of housing accommodation, rapidly and cheaply the use of constructions not aimed at high storey buildings of this nature failures to put in place methods whereby there was no secondary support structure in place, in the event of a failure with any of the load-bearing walls failures with the processes being followed, which resulted in the misemploy processes being followed in the connection of the gas pipes, as well as other omissions during the construction process, with the failure to follow the design provided.It can be seen, that the project wariness would have, at least in part, dealt with many of these failures and would have either th warted the explosion, in the first place, or would have seriously minify the impact of the explosion, once it did take place. The crucial factor in this analysis is that the explosion itself was relatively claw, yet the repercussions were large and it is this chain of events that requires attention when it comes to give way project management, in the future.Recommendations for Better Project ManagementCertain failures took place at the design phase, when the design construction of the premises was selected, yet was not entirely suitable for a 22 storey building. This was arguably the first and crucial failure which could have been avoided with further research into the limitations of this design.However, the main pore of the recommendations presented here is in relation to the project management process, from the point at which the design was presented for the construction, to the point at which the building was completed (Pearson and Delatte, 2005).At the outset, when the proj ect team came together, there was an opportunity to run scenarios and to groom the validity of the elect construction, given the design that were being presented and the need to establish a 22 storey building. By path these types of scenarios, it is likely that it would become apparent that the chosen construction design was entirely inappropriate. Even without this element of the project management being undertaken and risk assessments being carried out, the coterminous stage of the project management should have involved a strong quality control check for every aspect of the work.The fundamental design of the building was proven to be flawed however, there were also errors during the actual construction phase, for example the use of the wrong connections when it came to the gas pipes installed. Although this, in itself, did not lead to the catastrophic collapse of part of the building, it did create a minor gas explosion which started the chain of events. Quality control proc esses at every phase of construction and engagement would have potentially prevented the chain of events from emerging, in the first place (Shepherd and Frost, 1995). nigh Steps and ConclusionsBearing this in mind, there are several proposed changes and next steps which could be taken to prevent a similar failure happening in the future.Firstly, although the design used was accepted during this era, it was known that it would simply not be appropriate for the type of building which was being planned. This should have been noted, at the outset, with additional safety structures then planed so as to prevent this type of progressive collapse from taking place.Secondly, worst-case scenarios should be run, at the outset, to enable the project managers to ascertain whether any weaknesses existed. Moreover, although the rest of collapse in this case resulted in the building being destroyed, it was also not able to sustain strong winds and this also, ultimately, could have resulted in the building becoming uninhabitable. By running scenarios, such as high winds or explosion, these issues would have been highlighted and changes in the design could have been incorporated, from the outset (Pearson and Delatte 2003).Finally, quality control during the construction process was also not suitable. This should have been done with much greater consistency, to ensure that the small processes, such as the fitting of connections, was carried out to an appropriate standard, thus preventing the minor incident that ultimately led to the overall disaster.By following these view project management approaches and ensuring that an individual was put in place, in order to manage quality and control, as well as any variables in this area, the collapse of the building could have been avoided, or at least the cause of the collapse mitigated against, so as not to cause disadvantage of life and injury.ReferencesBignell, V., Peters, J., and Pym, C. (1977). Catastrophic failures. Open Univ ersity Press, Milton Keynes, New York.Cagley, J. R. (2003, April). The design professionals concerns regarding progressive collapse design. Building Sciences, 27, 4-6.Delatte, N. J. (2009). Beyond failure Forensic case studies for civil engineers. American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), Reston, Virginia, 97-106. engine room News go in (ENR). (1968). Systems built apartment collapse. ENR, May 23, 1968, 54.Griffiths, H., Pugsley, A. G., and Saunders, O. (1968). Report of the inquiry into the collapse of flats at Ronan Point, Canning Town. Her Majestys Stationery Office, London.Levy, M., and Salvadori, M. (1992). Why buildings fall down How structures fail. W.W. Norton, New York, 76-83.Pearson, C., and Delatte, N. (2003). Lessons from the Progressive Collapse of the Ronan Point Apartment mainstay. In Forensic Engineering, minutes of the Third Congress, edited by Paul A. Bosela, Norbert J. Dellate, and Kevin L. Rens, ASCE, Reston, VA., pp. 190-200.Pearson, C.,and Delatte, N. J. ( 2005) Ronan Point Apartment Tower Collapse and Its Effect on Building Codes. J. Perf. of Constr. Fac., 19(2), 172-177.Shepherd, R., and Frost, J. D. (1995). Failures in Civil Engineering Structural, Foundation, and Geoenvironmental Case Studies, ASCE, New York.Wearne, P. (2000). Collapse When Buildings Fall Down, TV Books, L.L.C., New York, 137-156.